INTRODUCTION
Public perceptions of risk have proven t o be a critical barrier t o the federal L -government's extensive; decade-long, technical and scientific effort to site facilities for the interim storage and permanent disposal of high-level radioactive waste (HLW). The negative imagery, fear, and anxiety that are linked to "nuclear" and "radioactive" technologies, activities, and facilities by the public originate from the personal realities and experiences of individuals and the information they receive. These perceptions continue t o be a perplexing problem for those responsible for making decisions about federal nuclear waste management policies and programs. The problem of understanding and addressing public perceptions is made even more diflicult because there are decidedly different opinions about I HLW held by the public and nuclear industry and radiation health experts, (1) a sample of radiation health scientists overwhelmingly believe the public's fear of radiation is substantially greater than realistic (Cohen, 1986) , and (2) there are scientists and engineers who view nuclear technologies in a more positive manner and feel that interim storage and geologic disposal can be made safe (Flynn et al., 1993 observed behavior does not support predicted negative effects based on those responses (Metz, 1994) . Nevertheless, the public's perceptions of risk and fears cannot be ignored or subverted during siting activities awaiting the development of indisputable engineering, technological, or scientific evidence.
Federal policymakers feel it is critical to resolve issues related t o the interim storage and permanent disposal _of the growing volume of spent nuclear fuel ( S W ) produced by this nation's 112 civilian nuclear reactors and the HLW created as a by-product during nuclear weapons production. The U.S. Congress expedited the repository siting process by amending the Nuclear Waste Policy Act in 1987, designating the Yucca Mountain site in Nevada as the sole candidate for a $6 billion characterization effort to determine its suitability as a permanent disposal site. In parallel, a volunteer siting process was created for a Monitored Retrievable Storage (MRS) facility and repository. Each new siting attempt by the U.S.
Department of Energy (DOE) or the independent Office of the United States Nuclear Waste
Negotiator has met strong and vocal resistance based on the public's perceptions of risk.
State government officials and many researchers ardently claim that being a host to such a facility could possibly result in a potential stigmatization and substantial economic losses (Slovic et. al., 1991 and potential significant losses to the economic sectors at risk, especially the image-sensitive city of Las Vegas. The claim is based on two premises.
First, the intense, negative imagery associated with nuclear wastes that was elicited in over two dozen surveys of Nevada, Arizona, and California residents, of national populations, and of organizations (Mountain West Research, 1989; Flynn et al., 1990; Mushkatel et ak, 1990; Easterling, Kunreuther, 1993) . Second, a conceptual &amework for a social amplification of risk model which postulates that repository-related stimuli or key risk events can be transformed (via various complex information and social processes and pathways) into massive indirect social and economic impacts (Kasperson et al., 1988; Burns et al., 1993; Renn, 1993 (1993) note that "more research is needed to determine how well intentions predict d l i c -response to risk. Similarly, the behavioral intentions university students display toward a hazardous event may be M e r e n t than those of the general population." Until greater primary research is initiated, secondary media information and survey data, often incomplete and reflecting various interpretations and biases, can be used for an initial assessment of the social amplification of key events and resulting behavioral responses. It is critical to begin to stimulate a dialogue on whether the conceptual fkamework is repository specific or can be applied to all DOE nuclear-related facilities.
KEY RISK EVENTS
The purpose of the conceptual fi.amework was "to begin the building a comprehensive theory that explains why seemingly minor risks or risk events often produce extraordinary public concern and social and economic impacts, with rippling effects across time, space, and social institutions" (Kasperson et al. 1988 
Key Risk Events Mentioned in Surveys
People's perception 7 -t h t there is a potential for key risk events t o originate from the interim storage, disposal, or transport of nuclear materials has been the subject of numerous surveys.
Local, state, regional, and national populations, as well as various organizations, have been asked for their opinions about different accident and contamination scenarios, ranging in magnitude from no radioactive releases and contamination to major releases and contamination and from minor injuries t o multiple deaths. The purpose has been to statistically determine the extent of the public's belief in the probability of various types of risk events and its perception of the severity and duration of the consequences of these events. Questions alluding t o factors that could elevate or dampen a person's perception of risk have also been asked, such as those related to the degree of trust the person has in those who could be involved in the potential risk event, the person's knowledge of HLW, facility management competency, and whether there is open sharing of scientific and accident data.
Surveys related to a repository have focused on residents of Washington, Texas, and Nevada -past and present candidate states for repositories. They show the strength of perceived impacts. Desvouges et al. (1993) found that approximately 75% of both a national and Nevada sample either agreed or strongly agreed that an accident at a repository would involve certain death, over 80% in each thought an accident would be catastrophic, 63%
perceived that large accidental releases of radiation from a repository were somewhat or very likely, and approximately 75% believed repository wastes would leak radiation into In a survey of convention planners, Easterling and Kunreuther (1993) elicited opinions on the potential for a negative effect from a repository by presenting a range of facility operating scenarios. They were asked if they would still choose Las Vegas as a convention site when confronted with each of seven scenarios, rangkg in severity from benign operations (no accidents over the first 10 years of repository operation), t o more serious scenarios (e.g., minor and moderate repository and transportation accidents involving cases of radiation exposure), t o even more serious scenarios (e.g., multiple mishaps leading to 15 cases of radiation exposure and a higher-than-expected risk condition being present).
Those who are predicted t o change from a Las Vegas meeting location ranged from between 12% and 36% of the sample under a benign scenario to between 47% and 80% under the most severe scenario of multiple mishaps with amplified media attention.
Surveys related to the possible siting of interim storage facilities in Tennessee conducted by Fox et al. (1985) show respondents are concerned about its harmful characteristics. Jenkins-Smith (1993) elicited similar concerns from New Mexico and Idaho residents about the&el&ood of accidental releases from the temporary storage, transport, and permanent storage 'of transuranic wastes and the consequences of those releases, including death and serious illness, uninhabitability of land in the vicinity of the accidents, and possible remediability of the area over time.
Surveys have consistently shown that the public strongly believes that accidents with significant consequences w i l l accompany the storage, disposal, and transport of HLW. (1991) , places the blame on an overemphasis on production for national security, outdated equipment and facilities, manufacturing processes that were inherently waste producing, lack of attention to environmental contamination, inadequate safety and health oversight, insufficient funding, and existing environmental and hazardous waste problems. Additional The public has been presented with a extensive litany of key discrete and cumulative minor and major r i k e v e n t s involving Weapons Complex facilities. Accounts are of:
Previously secret plutonium storage locations;
Potentially explosive leaking underground HLW storage tanks;
Significant deterioration of federal SNF' kept in defective storage pools;
Tritium spills and leaks into major rivers and aquifers;
Large numbers of workers exposed t o unacceptable levels of radioactivity;
Worker deaths from accidents;
Uranium contamination in off-site wells and aquifers;
Hundreds of intentional and unintentional radioactive releases, several hundreds of thousands of times more potent than that of the Three Mile Island accident;
Safety board concerns about procedures for dismantling nuclear weapons;
Transportation accidents and incidents involving nuclear materials; and
Revelations of possible and actual off-site health problems.
Past and present key risk events at these facilities could conceivably be considered worse than those expected to accompany a new HLW repository or interim storage facility.
Reason being the evolving, strident change in the management culture within DOE away from secrecy and a fixation on weapons production, no matter the cost, to one of greater regulatory compliance and citizen involvement. This w i l l be accompanied by an internal implementation of higher standards for environment, safety, and health, including management and contractor accountability.
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OCCURRING NEAR WEAPONS COMPLEX

FACILITIES
The social-akplification of risk model predicts that key risk events, especially nuclear and radioactive incidents, can cause substantial social and economic consequences.
Therefore, in host areas surrounding Weapons Complex facilities, effects should be apparent.
"he current social and economic conditions around Weapons Complex facilities reflect a history of more than 40 years, during which a multitude of discrete and cumulative key risk events interacted with dynamic site-specific and area-specific social and economic variables (e.g. , site mission, employment characteristics, diversity and stability of regional economic sectors, demographic profiles, area amenities and disamenities, trust relationships, and community interactions with site management).
A preliminary assessment of effects was made by using infarmation fiom the media, personal observations, and reports. There was an apparent lack of readily observable effects, contrary to the model's assertions. This could be the result of (1) 
Business Activities
Business activities have steadily expanded outward from population centers and now encroach on the previously remote, secret Weapons facilities. Different types of businesses have varying reasons for selecting sites in proximity and making operational decisions.
Agriculturd activities are location dependent and directly respond to consumer demands and concerns. M a n u f a c t w g and service sector siting decisions are significantly influenced by a h ' s size, product structure, h c t i o n a l organization, occupational characteristics, mode --of transportation, and personal preferences of management. In a survey of firms, found that when a firm has locational flexibility, amenity factors, such as the natural and cultural environment, become more important in siting decisions. Initial research by found no significant negative economic effects of commercial and federal nuclear facilities on the hosting local communities; the greater the quality of the nuclear facility's participation with a host community, the better the acceptance.
State and local government officials, supported by area economic development agencies, have aggressively sought to extend the lifespan, as well as expand the operation of their existing Weapons Complex facilities, not close them. Ohio business and political communities attempted to retain tritium-related work at the Mound site and uranium enrichment activities at Piketon. Eighty-five percent of Amarillo-area residents surveyed "indicated that they were favorable or leaned favorably toward expanding the Pantex Plant (Timms, 1991). There has been strong state pressure t o continue the testing of nuclear weapons at the Nevada Test Site (NTS).
The fkancial community has examined the economic future of adjacent and host cities and counties, upgrading bond ratings. Two locations are the City of Las Vegas (even at the time of the passage of the 1987 Nuclear Waste Policy Act Amendment designating Yucca Mountain for characterization and continued nuclear testing) (Metz, 1992) and Aken County, South Carolina, host t o S a , which received the highest rating available (Steele,
1994).
Tourism and recreational activities continue t o grow in the vicinity of Weapons
Complex facilities. New mega-resorts are being constructed in Las Vegas, 65 miles from the NTS, and more are pljmned as the City seeks to promote a revised image as a family resort. instead it be divided into both farmland and a nature preserve.
-- (1993) found proximity is also an issue at SRS where approximately 40% of those residing within 50 miles had a good attitude toward the facility, while less than 25% of those residing within 50-100 miles and about 12% of those residing more than 100 miles had good attitudes. The media (Willette, 1990; Sharp, 1990) 
--
The answer to understanding and addressing public perceptions of risk may reside in placing the survey responses and model claims in context by focusing on the dynamics of perceptions and behavior. Perceptions must be assessed in the context of this nation's nuclear "omnipresence" (several hundred nuclear facilities and continual movement of nuclear materials along its rail and highway networks). In addition, the public does have some very positive feelings toward nuclear technologies used in the medical field and for energy production. To have researchers extrapolating policy recommendations from frequency distributions of survey responses and images and a partially tested conceptual model -without fully researching and explaining (1) what the complex causes of these perceptions are, (2) how the perceptions are acted upon, (3) why paradoxes exist between claims and reality, (4) how people acquiesce or accept the risk, (5) how risks can be managed in a participatory manner, (6) whether the public understands the policy issues in context with alternative storage and disposal solutions, and (7) what the public prefers as alternative solutions -diminishes public involvement in the HLW decision-making process. The research community must be able to identify and validate behavior linkages between nuclear and radioactive key risk events and significant social and economic consequences prior to proposing national policy changes.
